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Beyond the Capitalist Workplace:  How the Production of Surplus Across the Economy 
Keeps Producers Divided1 
 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the public and household sectors of the economy as sites of surplus 
production within contemporary capitalist societies.  It also shows how the coexistence of 
structurally distinct spheres of surplus production creates divisions among workers in the private, 
public, and household sectors of the economy, thus amplifying the racial, gender, and other 
divisions which have often in the past kept working people divided.  Fueling these cross-sector 
divisions is the appearance that private-sector workers are paid for their labor rather than for 
their labor-power.  Thus, this article also explores an implication of this appearance which Karl 
Marx, the thinker who did the most to expose it, did not himself explore. 
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This article analyzes the public and household sectors of the economy as structurally distinct 
sites of surplus production, in which public-sector workers and people performing housework 
add to the economic surplus.  It also links the long-standing assumption that workers in these 
sectors do not contribute to the surplus to the mystifying appearance within capitalist societies 
that private-sector workers are paid for their labor rather than for the reproduction of their labor-
power.  The article also illustrates how the pursuit of more surplus within the capitalist sector can 
lead private-sector workers to cope with capitalist exploitation in ways which increase the 
extraction of a surplus from public sector and household workers, while also showing how this 
coping strategy can ironically accentuate the burden of capitalist exploitation on private-sector 
workers themselves. 
2. The Significance of the Surplus Within the Marxist Tradition 
An important contribution of Marxism to our understanding of social, historical, and economic 
dynamics is its concept of the surplus.  Marxist (and some non-Marxist) scholars have linked the 
emergence of a surplus to the rise of class societies and the state as well as to the long-term 
advance of labor productivity (Marx 1977: 646-647; Mandel 1971: 25-28 and 39-42; Cohen 
2001: 198; Himmelweit 1991: 183; Harman 2008: 22; Nolan and Lenski 1998: 150-151).  These 
links have also allowed Marxists to interpret history as a progressive process of human liberation 
from scarcity, with class societies representing a necessary stage within it (Cohen 1988: vii; 
Cohen 2001: 207; Engels 1978: 714; Harman 2008: 26).   
Because of its dynamism, capitalism enjoys a special status in this scheme for two 
reasons.  Economic competition forces capitalists to reinvest the surplus productively (Marx 
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1977: 739; Wright and Rogers 2011: 43; Bonaiuti 2012: 30-32).  This increases labor 
productivity and the surplus to levels high enough to create the potential for a classless society 
which would promote human well-being rather than further enrich an already affluent minority 
(Marx 1977: 239; Eagleton 2010: 101-102; Cohen 2001: 206).   
In this narrative an important mechanism driving history forward is class struggle.  The 
division, within class societies, between the class producing the surplus and the class receiving it 
gives rise to struggles over the size and disposition of this surplus (Engels 1972: 228; Bowles, 
Edwards, and Roosevelt 2005: 108; Shaikh 1997: 72; Himmelweit 1992: 386; Mandel 1971: 41-
42).  In predicting capitalism’s replacement by a classless society, Marx and Engels were making 
two assumptions.  First, viewing repeated economic crises as a sign that capitalism was 
becoming an obstacle to further productive development, they expected the clash between forces 
and relations of production to trigger revolutionary change (Marx and Engels 1978: 478; Marx 
1970: 21; Marx 1978: 593; Marx 1973: 749-750; Engels 1978: 714-715).  Secondly, this would 
happen through capitalism’s simplification and sharpening of class antagonisms, as well as its 
facilitation of the unification and organization of workers into a force capable of ending class 
exploitation (Marx 1970: 21; Marx and Engels 1978). 
Capitalism continues to generate economic crises but has not blocked productive 
development.  By now, even many Marxists doubt whether capitalism will ever become an 
insuperable obstacle to further productive development, while other socialist and Marxist 
theorists view capitalist crises as integral to the way productive development occurs (Baran and 
Sweezy 1966: 342; Cohen 2001: 327; Heilbroner 1986: 161; Panitch and Miliband 1992: 16).  So 
while economic crises may render capitalism more vulnerable politically by inflicting great 
suffering on large numbers of people, while also rendering the risks of transition to a non-
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capitalist society less daunting (Panayotakis 2011: 134; Cohen 2001: 245; Wolff and Resnick 
2012: 199), they will not necessarily subvert capitalism by blocking productive development.  
But if this assumption underlying the Marxist tradition’s optimism is problematic, it becomes 
important to also interrogate Marxism’s assumption that capitalist development will unify 
workers against capitalism. 
Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars have to some extent theorized how capital has used 
race, gender, ethnicity, and so on to keep producers divided.  This line of research, however, 
often takes for granted the traditional Marxist identification of the private capitalist workplace as 
the paradigmatic locus of surplus production and extraction.  This article, by contrast, 
emphasizes the contribution to surplus production that the household and public sectors of the 
economy also make, while also investigating the political implications of the existence of distinct 
spheres of surplus production within contemporary capitalism.   
 
3. Production and Surplus Generation in the Public and Household Sectors of the 
Economy 
The key idea behind the concept of the surplus is that the workers whose production sustains 
social life produce a greater output than that necessary to reproduce their own labor-power.  The 
living standards necessary to reproduce workers’ labor-power are not physiologically determined 
but rather the product of social struggle (Marx 1977: 275; Ferguson 2002: 134).  They represent 
a necessary product that workers would have to generate irrespective of the social relations of 
production (Marx 1977: 324).  In other words, this level of production would be necessary even 
in a classless society without an exploiting class living off the producers’ work.   
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Marxist and neo-Marxist economists have defined this necessary product in more or less 
expansive ways.  Unlike overly expansive definitions which include in it the output necessary to 
reproduce a society’s current level of capital goods (Bowles, Edwards, and Roosevelt 2005: 103) 
and overly restrictive definitions which do not include in it any of the output required to 
reproduce the current level of capital goods (Wolff and Resnick 2012: 155), this article defines 
the necessary product in a way consistent with the key idea underlying the concept of the 
surplus.  In particular, for the necessary product to be able to reproduce the workers’ labor-
power, it would have to include both the workers’ customary means of subsistence (this is one 
part of the necessary product that all definitions agree on) and the output necessary to reproduce 
only the capital goods necessary to generate the producers’ customary standard of living. 
  Expressing this line of reasoning in a formula, we can, therefore, write: 
Producers’ output=Necessary Product + surplus (1)   
This formula does not provide as yet any information regarding the sites of surplus production.  
In its generality, however, it is consistent with the insistence of feminist economists that 
households are as much “sites of production” (di Leonardo and Lancaster 2002: 48) and a part of 
the economy as capitalist workplaces (Acker 2003: 20, Mutari and Figart 2003: 97, Bennholdt-
Thomsen 1984).  In this sense, it serves as a corrective to the treatment, by traditional economic 
approaches, of much of the work women perform, including most of the care given within 
households (Chant 2011: 181; Duggan 2011: 107; Ferguson 2002: 135; Sen and Ostlin 2011: 65; 
Figart, Mutari, and Power 2003: 48; Folbre 2011: 41; Folbre 2009: 312; Federici 2012: 108), as a 
free natural resource which does not merit being recognized as human labor (Federici 2012: 147; 
Mies 1986: 46 and 110; Folbre 2008: 14).   
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In particular, formula (1) is consistent with the feminist insistence on the economic and 
productive contribution of work within households because of the clear contribution of 
housework to the necessary product.  As feminist economists have pointed out, the reproduction 
of the labor-power of workers in the private (and, for that matter, public and household) sector of 
the economy crucially depends on housework.  The means of subsistence that private (and 
public) sector workers buy with their wages and salaries often represent no more than domestic 
means of production, which are only converted into the workers’ customary standard of living 
through housework.  For example, the raw steak that private- (and public-) sector workers’ 
wages and salaries buy in the super-market cannot reproduce their labor-power until someone 
cooks it at home (Blumenfeld and Mann 1980: 285; Federici 2012: 96; Mutari and Figart 2003: 
97; Folbre 2009: 125-126; Gardiner 1979: 182).  Similarly, as Marx (1977: 275) himself 
recognized, the product necessary to reproduce wage workers’ labor-power also includes the 
product necessary to raise the younger generation which will replace today’s workers when they 
retire.  While for Marx this meant that workers must be able to afford raising children, raising 
children requires much more than purchasing an additional set of commodities.  Highly ‘labor-
intensive’ (Federici 2012: 145-146), parenting has justly been described as “one of the most 
physically, intellectually, and emotionally demanding types of work” (Bowles and Edwards 
1993: 183).  As Nancy Folbre (2008: 11) points out, “conceiv[ing], nurur[ing], educat[ing], and 
launch[ing babies] into adulthood … requires considerable time and effort as well as money.”  In 
short, if housework contributes to the necessary product, the people performing it deserve 
recognition as workers no less than the wage workers producing the subsistence commodities on 
which the reproduction of workers in all sectors of the economy also depends. 
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But households are not the only sites outside the private capitalist workplace to contribute 
to the necessary product.  As Marx (1977: 276) himself recognized, the reproduction of wage 
workers’ labor-power presupposes education and training.  This requirement has, moreover, 
increased over time as capitalism’s technological dynamism revolutionizes not just the means of 
production but also the labor skills that operating these means of production requires (Seccombe 
1980b: 237-238 and 252).  To the extent, moreover, that this education and training usually takes 
place in public schools and colleges (Galbraith 1999: 168 and 175-176), it follows that the public 
sector of the economy contributes to the necessary product.  The same is true for public 
healthcare systems or the parts of government responsible for building and maintaining the 
infrastructures on which the reproduction of workers’ labor-power also depends (Seccombe 
1980b: 218).   
 
4. From Capitalist Mystification to the Denial of Households’ and the Public Sector’s 
Economic Contribution 
The reduction of the requirements for reproducing workers’ labor-power to the subsistence 
commodities purchased by wage workers arguably represents an insufficient emancipation, on 
the part of Marxist theory, from the ideological mystifications that capitalism systematically 
generates.  Marx attacked these mystifications through his distinction between labor and labor-
power (Mandel 1977: 50; Marx 1977: 270; Seccombe 1980a: 82).  This distinction allowed him 
to explain the existence of exploitation in an economic system seemingly based on equality, 
freedom and the presumably mutually beneficial contractual agreements between capitalist 
employers and their workers (Marx 1977: 280).   
8 
 
Marx pointed out that wages did not represent compensation for the labor workers 
performed but the market price of the commodified labor-power they sold.  It was the difference 
between their output and the output represented by the subsistence commodities that they could 
buy with their wage which enabled capitalists to extract a surplus (Marx 1977: 300-301).  This 
difference is, however, much less obvious to workers and capitalists than the fact that workers 
get paid more, the more hours they work.  As a result, the capitalist wage system, along with the 
capitalist division of labor which makes it impossible to compare the quantity of output workers 
produce to the quantity of the entirely different subsistence goods they purchase with their wage 
(Roemer 1988: 46-47), creates the appearance that workers are compensated for their labor rather 
than being exploited (Marx 1977: 675). 
But there is another side to this appearance.  In suggesting that capitalists pay for their 
worker’s labor rather than for their labor-power, this appearance also leads workers to conclude 
that their wages are a reward for their own efforts.  Marx’s distinction between the worker’s 
labor and the labor-power s/he sells in the market has the potential to pierce through this 
ideological perception.  However, Marx (1977: 274-276) does not explore this potential when he 
equates necessary labor to the labor necessary to produce the subsistence commodities workers 
purchase (Seccombe 1980a: 82).  This definition makes it seem as if private-sector workers are 
entirely self-supporting, since it hides the extent to which the reproduction of their labor-power 
depends on household and public-sector workers.  Thus, it encourages private-sector workers to 
view themselves as ‘supporting’ workers in the other sectors of the economy, whenever part of 
their wage is used to finance the contribution of those other workers 
So the belief that workers outside the private sector are supported by workers within it is 
fueled by the appearance that the latter are paid for their labor.  For example, this appearance 
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obscures the fact that, in societies where one-‘breadwinner’ households may be the norm, the 
wage breadwinners receive is determined by the cost of reproducing all contributors to the 
reproduction of this breadwinner’s labor-power (Seccombe 1980a: 82; Curtis 1980: 111).  In 
other words, the wage does not reward the breadwinners for their labor but reflects the 
requirements of reproducing not just the breadwinners themselves but also their homemaker 
partners whose work allows the breadwinners to continue selling their labor-power.   
Moreover, by suggesting to sole breadwinners that their wage is rightfully theirs, the 
appearance that wage workers are rewarded for their labor also legitimizes their control of family 
income (Seccombe 1980a: 82; Gardiner 1979: 183).  The reproduction of their labor-power may 
be as dependent on the work performed by the full-time homemaker as the reproduction of the 
homemaker’s labor-power depends on the breadwinner’s earnings (Mies 1986: 160).  However, 
the appearance that these earnings reward the breadwinner’s labor creates the appearance that the 
breadwinner ‘supports’ their home-making partner.   
The ideological effects of this appearance, moreover, persist even as two-breadwinner 
households become prevalent even outside the low-income and racialized groups, which had 
always been less able to survive on one income (Amott and Matthaei 1991: 95-96, 100-101, and 
351).  In view of the historically gendered nature of the sole breadwinner model, which, with the 
exception of one-parent households, defined the husband/father as the breadwinner and the 
wife/mother as the homemaker, one of that model’s legacies is the sexist interpretation of 
women’s paid work as merely supplementing that of the ‘main’ breadwinner, who is often still 
assumed to be their male partner (Elson and Pearson 2011: 213; Levin 2003: 156; Shulman 
2003: 211; Peterson 2003: 281; Chodorow 1979: 90; Miles 1990: 136).  This ideological belief 
has long justified the discrimination and gender wage gap that women continued to face, even 
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after their participation in paid work increased dramatically (Albelda and Tilly 2002: 266; 
Wakabayashi 2017; Folbre 2009: 295; Charles and Grusky 2007: 327-329; Stacey 2002: 93-94; 
MacLean 2002: 190; Miles 1990: 241).   
A similar argument applies to the relationship between private-sector workers and their 
public sector counterparts.  The appearance that the former are paid for their labor obscures the 
implications of the fact that the reproduction of their labor-power is as dependent on the work of 
public sector teachers, nurses, doctors and so on, as the reproduction of the labor-power of the 
latter is dependent on the subsistence commodities they can purchase thanks to salaries, which 
are, in part, financed by the taxes that private-sector workers (among others) pay.  In particular, 
the portion of private-sector workers’ taxes used to pay public sector workers who contribute to 
the necessary product is likely to be experienced by private-sector workers as the government 
taking from them money they earned through their labor to ‘support’ public-sector workers who 
are often portrayed by corporate media, austerity-dispensing politicians and neoliberal 
ideologues as lazy, incompetent and pampered parasites (Weiner 2018: 3; Abramovitz 2012: 35; 
Pollin and Thompson 2011: 24; Moody 2011: 222; Fabricant 2011: 236).  Thus, the appearance 
that private-sector workers are paid for their labor also obscures the fact that the portion of these 
workers’ taxes used to pay public school teachers, doctors, nurses and so on, is comparable to the 
portion of the worker’s wages which is spent on subsistence commodities.  Just as the latter pays 
for the food necessary to reproduce the private-sector worker’s labor-power, so does the former 
provide educational and health services which have the same effect.  Reinforcing this 
appearance, of course, is the centuries-old portrayal, by political economy and mainstream 
economics, of the state as living off the wealth produced in the private sector (Mazzucato 2018: 
239-41; Folbre 2008: 174).   
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In this sense, the long-standing view of the public sector as parasitically growing at the 
expense of the private sector is an ideological mystification inseparable from the appearance of 
wages as compensation for labor.  In short, both the invidious contrast between the public and 
private sectors of the economy and the ideological justification of gender discrimination on the 
grounds that women working for pay merely supplement the income earned by their male 
partners are directly connected to the mystifications generated by the wage form.   
 
5. Austerity and Surplus Production Across the Economy 
One implication of this discussion is that both the workers’ output and the necessary product in 
Formula (1) above are generated through housework and public sector activities as well as in the 
private sector.  And just as private-sector workers produce a larger output than the portion of the 
output they can purchase with their wage, so can we not preclude workers in the public sector or 
households producing a larger output than that necessary to reproduce their own labor-power.  In 
other words, the possibility that, alongside a private-sector surplus, workers in capitalist societies 
also generate a public-sector as well as a household surplus must be considered.   This point can 
be illustrated by reference to the struggles over austerity, following the onset of the global 
capitalist crisis a little more than ten years ago. 
Although (and because) economic crises can have a negative effect on capitalist profit, 
they often facilitate economic restructuring designed to increase the surplus extracted from 
workers.  This can happen not just through rising levels of unemployment, which increase 
workers’ insecurity and make it harder for them to organize and fight for wages that keep up 
with productivity increases (Kolko 1999: 292; Marx 1977: 785-86; Sweezy 1970: 90). It can also 
result from the use of economic crisis, unemployment, and the consequent weakening of the 
12 
 
labor movement as an opportunity to speed up work and attack labor rights (Amott and Matthaei 
1991: 128-30).  A prime example of this dynamic during the most recent capitalist crisis have 
been countries in the European periphery, such as Greece, which have seen drastic attacks on 
hard-won labor rights and working-class standards of living (Miller 2015: 47; Panayotakis 2011: 
2-3 and 92). 
This is as true of public-sector workers as it is of their private-sector counterparts.  
Attacks on labor rights and wages are not confined to the private sector.  In the United States, for 
example, public-sector workers have been the central focus of assaults on labor and collective 
bargaining rights, precisely because public sector unions now represent the last stronghold of a 
seriously weakened labor movement (Abramovitz 2012: 35; Panayotakis 2011: 91; Fabricant 
2011: 236).   
Since Formula (1) can be rewritten as 
Surplus=Producers’ output – Necessary product (2),  
these attacks affect the surplus extracted from producers through their effect both on producers’ 
output and on the necessary product.  As far as producers’ output is concerned, attacks on labor 
rights and unions make it easier for employers to increase production by accelerating the pace of 
work and ratcheting up the effort expected of workers.  Meanwhile, such attacks, in combination 
with high levels of unemployment, make it harder for workers to resist those moves, all the more 
so as these moves to deregulate the labor market are often falsely presented as a cure to 
unemployment and economic crisis (Panayotakis 2014: 11). 
At the same time, the attacks on the standard of living of private- and public-sector 
workers by austerity policies the world over also reduce the necessary product by redefining the 
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standard of living socially deemed necessary to reproduce workers’ labor-power.  Thus, for 
example, the reduction in the real (or even nominal) value of wages and salaries means that 
private- and public-sector workers can lay claim to a smaller portion of the output produced in 
the capitalist sector of the economy.   
At the same time, public sector austerity can reduce the necessary product in yet another 
way.  Through public sector layoffs and intentional personnel attrition when older teachers, 
doctors, nurses, and other public-sector workers retire, austerity often leads to understaffing 
which distributes the public-sector work necessary to reproduce socially available labor-power 
among a shrinking number of workers (Albo and Evans 2010: 291; Clawson 2013: 30; Konczal 
2014: 83-84; Kroll 2013: 42; Miller 2015: 47, Lav 2014: 52-3, Pashkoff 2014: 59).  This reduces 
the necessary product because the public sector output necessary, for example, to keep workers 
educated and healthy will require the monetary compensation of fewer public-sector workers.  In 
short, austerity can reduce the necessary product by reducing both the compensation of 
individual workers and the number of public-sector workers compensated for helping to 
reproduce socially available labor-power. 
Not merely a theoretical possibility, such outcomes have often resulted from the wave of 
austerity following the most recent global capitalist crisis.  In Britain, austerity “means that 
public-sector workers are working longer and harder, due to job cutbacks, for less pay, and for a 
pension that is actually going to be worth less” (Pashkoff 2014: 59).  Similarly, if even more 
dramatically, the ‘structural reforms’ imposed on the countries most hit by the Eurozone crisis 
“included severe cuts in government spending, cutbacks in jobless benefits, health care spending, 
mass layoffs, pay cuts and eviscerated pensions for government employees, and tax hikes” 
(Miller 2015: 47).  As for the United States, the mass layoffs that state and local governments 
14 
 
implemented in response to the global economic crisis have meant that, by 2014, “there [we]re 
705,000 fewer public workers since the recession started—the greatest decline since the Great 
Depression” (Konczal 2014: 83-84).  Even before that crisis however, austerity had been the lot 
of public higher education in the United States for decades.  In the California public higher 
education system, for example, “[a]s faculty members deal with larger class sizes, more papers to 
read, and more tests to grade, their pay has failed to keep pace” (Kroll 2013: 42).  The fact that 
such changes cannot but “lower the quality of education” (Clawson 2013: 30) also means, 
however, that overworking the workers in understaffed public colleges and other public 
institutions cannot always fully make up for the reduction in their numbers.  When this occurs 
and the educational, healthcare, and other public sector services decline, all workers’ labor-
power becomes devalued, as the output deemed necessary for its reproduction becomes redefined 
downwards. 
Thus, austerity policies can (and often do) increase the difference between the output of 
public-sector workers and the portion of the output devoted to the reproduction of their labor-
power.  In other words, austerity policies highlight the fact that there is no reason to assume that 
public-sector workers providing educational and healthcare services or building and maintaining 
crucial infrastructures do not produce an output exceeding the output deemed necessary to 
reproduce their own labor-power.  On the contrary, their long-standing (and ideological) 
portrayal as parasitical to the private sector increases their vulnerability to campaigns, such as 
these unleashed in a number of countries in recent years, which seek to increase the surplus 
extracted from them by demonizing them and falsely presenting them as a lazy elite which 
enjoys a high standard of living at the expense of hard-working taxpayers.  
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Austerity policies, however, also illustrate how housework can become an integral 
element in the production of a surplus.  To begin with, austerity policies and economic crises 
which reduce working-class incomes also reduce the ability of working-class households to meet 
their customary material needs through the purchase of commodities.  This is especially the case 
for racialized and immigrant groups, which are both adversely affected by capitalism’s 
segmented labor markets and especially vulnerable to the rising levels of unemployment which 
austerity policies and capitalist economic crises generate (Acker 2003: 17; Amott and Matthaei 
1991: 26 and 318, Kolko 1999: 282).   
As a result, working-class households often compensate for their reduced purchasing 
power by increasing housework (Briskin 1980: 159; Elson 2011: 298; Fox 1980: 187; Gardiner 
1979: 187; Lebowitz 1997: 234; Seccombe 1980b: 230).  Instead, for example, of eating out or 
purchasing prepared meals and cleaning services, households can produce such services within 
the household.  Similarly, Elson (2011: 298) reports, “producing more goods for home 
consumption” was one of the ‘household coping strategies’ revealed by “[a] nationally 
representative survey conducted by the Indonesian statistical office … after the onset of the 
[Asian financial] crisis” in the late 1990s.  Given the gender-stratified nature of contemporary 
capitalist societies, such a strategy places a disproportionate burden of austerity on women, who 
still perform a disproportionate share of housework (Bartky 1997: 290).   
Analyzing this possibility using Formula (2) illustrates the contribution that households 
can make to the production of a surplus.  Individual workers in the private sector can continue to 
produce the same amount of output (or may even, as a result of the economic insecurity that 
rising levels of  unemployment imply, have to increase that output) even as the portion of the 
private sector’s output they can lay claim to declines.  If working-class families attempt to make 
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up for this development by increasing the amount of housework, the decline in the household’s 
standard of living might be averted or mitigated.  In other words, the necessary product might not 
decline.  However, this outcome would only become possible by increasing the total output 
generated by workers within the household.  In other words, the difference between the total 
output the producers generated in the private and household sectors, on one side, and the portion 
of that output used to reproduce their labor-power would increase, thus also increasing the 
surplus extracted from them. 
There is, however, another way that austerity policies can fuel the strategy of 
compensating for reduced living standards through additional work performed within 
households.  One of the features of austerity policies, both in their most recent and in previous 
incarnations, such as the structural adjustment programs imposed throughout the global South, is 
the attack on public services, including childcare, education and healthcare (Panayotakis 2011: 
84-85; Federici 2012: 103; Nisonoff 2011: 205; Pollin 2013: 86; Seccombe 1980b: 256).  Here 
again, working-class families have often made up for these services by taking on much of the 
work formerly performed within the public sector (Abramovitz 2012: 34; Fraser 2016: 104; 
Petchesky 1979: 381; Seccombe 1980b: 257; Weinbaum and Bridges 1979: 197).  As Diane 
Elson (2017: 55) reports, “[r]esearch in a number of countries suggests that cuts to public 
expenditures have increased women’s unpaid work, especially for low-income women, as these 
women produce caregiving services formerly provided by the public sector.”  
Thus, members of working-class households may continue to generate the same (or even 
an increased) amount of output in their capacity as private- or public-sector workers, even as 
their defense of their customary standard of living requires them to increase the services they 
produce at home.  Thus, austerity on the public sector can, through slightly different channels, 
17 
 
produce the same effect as the attack on working people’s wages and salaries, namely to increase 
the surplus working-families are forced to produce. 
 
6. The Existence of Structurally Distinct Spheres of Production and Capitalism’s 
Generation of Divisions Among Workers 
This discussion illustrates how workers outside the private sector can be forced to add to the 
surplus.  It also points, however, to the possibility of divisions between workers in the different 
sectors.  In this respect, this discussion adds to, while being capable of encompassing within its 
framework, analyses, by radical and progressive scholars, of capital’s long-standing use of racial 
and gender differences to increase profit by keeping workers divided (Amott and Matthaei 1991: 
112; Harvey 2005: 168; Tabb 2012: 57; Wright and Rogers 2011: 249-50).  Such analyses have 
explained the persistence of racial and gender discrimination (Amott and Matthaei 1991: 340; 
Bendick, Jackson, and Reinoso 2000; Elson and Pearson 2011: 217; Kroll 2012: 53; Lewchuk 
2003: 69-69; Weinberger 2003: 173) against the neoclassical expectation that capitalist 
competition would erode discriminatory practices (Michaels 2010: 9; Mutari and Figart 2003: 
152; Schwarz-Miller and Talley 2003).  In particular, progressive and radical economists have 
argued that the addition to capitalist profits from discriminatory practices that facilitate 
exploitation by keeping workers divided often outweighs the cost of economic inefficiency that 
such practices entail (Panayotakis 2011: 59; Bowles and Edwards 1993: 218-20; Hahnel 2002: 
251-52). 
Although focused on private-sector workers, this argument is certainly consistent with the 
analytical frame implicit in Formula (2).  In particular, racial, gender, and other forms of 
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discrimination can increase the surplus extracted from workers through their impact on both 
private-sector workers’ output and on the product deemed socially necessary for their 
reproduction.  Contributing to this impact, moreover, are both the effects that discrimination has 
on the groups subjected to it and the effects of discrimination on working people as a whole.   
One possible effect of racial, gender, and other forms of discrimination is that women and 
members of racialized and oppressed groups may have to perform at a much higher level than 
their white male peers to be recognized and keep their job (Dymski 1997: 342-343).  In other 
words, racial, gender, and other forms of discrimination can force workers subjected to them to 
produce a higher output and, thus, a higher surplus than their male white peers.   
But racism and sexism can also increase the surplus extracted from workers subjected to 
them through their effect on the product deemed necessary for the reproduction of those workers’ 
labor-power.  One example is the sexist ideology, mentioned earlier, which defines the income of 
women in the paid labor force as merely ‘supplementary’ to that of their male partners, thus 
justifying the practice of paying female workers less than their male peers.  Thus, the social 
definition of the product necessary to reproduce different workers’ labor-power does not have to 
be uniform (Lebowitz 1997: 239) but can entrench existing racial, gender and other divisions.   
Another example of this dynamic is the great divide between workers in the global North 
and their counterparts in the global South (Panayotakis 2011: 75; Milanovic 2005: 140), which 
can be traced back to the links between capitalist development and colonialism as well as to the 
use of racist ideologies to justify colonial expansion by many of the now-affluent countries in the 
global North (Ahmad and Karrar 2015: 55; Panayotakis 2011: 79; Bagchi 2005: 232 and 245; 
Desai 2013: 32).  This history helps to explain the paradoxical fact, noted by Diane Elson and 
Ruth Pearson (2011: 212-13), that workers in the global South employed by transnational giants 
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earn much less than their peers in the global North despite levels of productivity “higher … than 
th[ose] achieved in developed countries.”  Phenomena like this point to the contribution of 
colonialism’s ideological and economic legacy on the social definition of the consumption levels 
necessary to reproduce workers in the global South.  Amplifying colonialism’s ideological 
impact is, of course, the fact that a large proportion of the industrial proletariat emerging in the 
global South are women (Federici 2012: 66; Kolko 1999: 283), who also have to contend with 
sexist definitions of the monetary compensation necessary to reproduce their labor-power. 
But capitalist profitability also benefits from the effects that discrimination has on the 
working class as a whole.  By fueling resentments and divisions which obstruct working-class 
unity, racial, gender and other forms of discrimination can increase the surplus extracted from all 
workers both by increasing the output workers have to produce and by depressing the living 
standards socially deemed necessary for their reproduction.  Indeed, lack of working-class unity 
makes it more difficult both to resist production speed-ups and to effectively pursue permanent 
wage increases, which can redefine the necessary product upwards (Panayotakis 2011: 59; 
Bowles and Edwards 1993: 218-20; Hahnel 2002: 251-52; Tabb 2012: 57; Wright and Rogers 
2011: 249-50). 
While consistent with the findings of previous attempts to understand divisions among 
private-sector workers, this article’s approach also highlights the divisions among producers that 
result from the existence of structurally distinct sites of surplus production.  This structural 
feature of capitalist societies creates the possibility of producers in one sector of the economy 
seeking, when faced with pressures to produce higher levels of surplus, to shift that pressure onto 
producers in other sectors.  Thus, instead of joining forces against the intensification of 
exploitation across the board that austerity and capitalist restructuring often entail, workers in the 
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various sectors of the economy can often find themselves squabbling over the distribution of the 
rising burdens imposed on them (Offe 1985: 2). 
Illustrating this possibility is the link between capitalist restructuring and the embrace, 
even by segments of the working class, of neoliberal attacks on ‘high taxes’ and the public 
sector.  The capitalist restructuring since the post-war ‘golden age’ of capitalism came to an end 
in the 1970s has led, in various affluent countries like the U.S, to the loss of many well-paying, 
unionized industrial jobs, their replacement by much lower-paid and more precarious service 
jobs, and a stagnation of working-class wages more generally (Bluestone and Harrison 1999; 
Mazzucato 2018: 113-114; Stacey 2002: 93).  In other words, industrial restructuring meant that 
private-sector wages and salaries did not keep up with rising productivity levels (Fraad 2008: 26; 
Hacker 2019: 54; Jones 2010: 14; Mazzucato 2018: xiii; Wright and Rogers 2011: 156-58).  
With the labor movement in decline as a result of neoliberal globalization, capital mobility, and 
deindustrialization (Levine 2015: 86-87; Yates 2009: 189-190), neoliberal attacks on big 
government and high taxes seduced segments of the working class, which, through lower taxes, 
hoped to mitigate the income losses inflicted on them (Brenner 2002: 342-43; O’Connor 1997: 
318).  Unfortunately, however, most of the benefits of neoliberal tax cuts have accrued to 
corporations and the very wealthy (Panayotakis 2013: 18; Moody 2011: 222).  Moreover, this 
coping strategy has fueled public sector austerity, which only promised to mitigate the intensified 
exploitation of private-sector workers by increasing the surplus public-sector workers had to 
produce.   
The segments of the working class most receptive to this strategy have been male white 
workers, who benefited the most from labor protections and benefits which the post-war model 
of ‘controlled capitalism’ denied many female and black workers (Amott and Matthaei 1991: 
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129-130 and 170-171; Fraser 2016: 110; Piven 2014: 23, Van Arsdale 2013: 94; Steger and Roy 
2010: 7; Zweig 2017: 34).  Faced with both staggering job losses in the relatively well-paid 
manufacturing sector and with the emergence of movements against gender and racial 
discrimination, many of these workers became receptive to the conservative fusion of calls for a 
small state with a cultural backlash against the social equality demanded by new social 
movements (Aronowitz 1992: 436; Brenner 2002: 340-41 and 343; Wright and Rogers 2011: 
391).  Predictably, upon achieving power, the new conservative coalition turned not just against 
the movements fighting race and gender discrimination but also against the union movement that 
had powered male white workers into such economic prosperity as they briefly enjoyed during 
capitalism’s post-war ‘golden age’ (Abramovitz 2002: 226; King 2003: 230; Steger and Roy 
2010: 7).  Indeed, the anti-labor decisions of conservative leaders, like Ronald Reagan, reversed 
“many of [the labor movement’s] hard-won gains” by “let[ting] business…know that it was okay 
to ‘go after’ the trade unions” (Abramovitz 2002: 226).  In so doing, they also highlighted how 
counterproductive, even for private-sector workers, it is to seek to mitigate their own exploitation 
by joining the small-tax, austerity bandwagon. 
More generally, the actual (as opposed to the promised) effects of neoliberal tax cuts 
show that the beneficiaries from the surplus generated by public-sector workers depends on the 
power of and struggles between different classes and social groups.  In democratic societies the 
receiver of this surplus are the democratically elected governments, which, ideally, make the 
benefits from this surplus (for example, better education, healthcare, and infrastructures, as well 
as lower taxes) available to all citizens.  In capitalist ‘democracies,’ however, the situation is 
more complex, since capital’s control over investment and the economy also provides it with 
disproportionate control over political outcomes (Bowles, Edwards, and Roosevelt 2005: 519-
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523).  Capital’s undemocratic power, in this respect, is amplified by the fact that, as the recent 
Eurozone crisis reminds us, governments’ operations depend not just on taxes but also on global 
financial markets.  This constellation of factors means that the intensification of public-sector 
workers’ exploitation often does more to enrich corporations and the very wealthy (through the 
skewed tax cuts this intensification of exploitation makes possible) than to benefit average 
citizens.  In other words, the existence of structurally distinct sites of surplus production may 
lend credence to the assumption that private-sector workers stand to benefit from the 
intensification of the exploitation faced by their public-sector counterparts.  Moreover, this 
assumption is often nurtured through capitalists’ ability “to devote portions of their surplus to 
sustaining … the cultural organizations that originate and/or disseminate theories, religions, and 
other ways of understanding how the world works that serve their interests” (Wolff 2012: 150).  
But just as capital’s control of the surplus can make this assumption seem plausible, so can it 
ensure that actual political outcomes often prove this assumption to be an ideological illusion.  In 
this respect, ideological campaigns which have blamed budget deficits caused by low corporate 
taxes and other corporate hand-outs on supposedly ‘unsustainable’ wages and benefits of public-
sector workers in Wisconsin and elsewhere are just one recent example of this dynamic (Moody 
2011: 223). 
Moreover, as our earlier discussion of the implications of public sector austerity for 
housework indicates, the support of segments of the working class for neoliberalism’s promise to 
cut taxes also represents an attempt to mitigate their heightened exploitation in the private (or, 
even public) sector of the economy by increasing the surplus produced, especially by women, 
within households.  Neoliberalism’s pressure on women to produce more surplus has often been 
amplified by ‘welfare’ reforms which have forced low-income women to look for paid 
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employment if they want to retain the often meager benefits they receive.  By increasing 
competition in the low-wage end of the labor market, such reforms have also had the effect of 
depressing wages and increasing exploitation in the private sector (Abramovitz 2002: 218-20 and 
225; Albelda and Tilly 2003: 269 and 271; Folbre 2008: 146; Hays 2007: 188).  And as labor 
markets in contemporary capitalist economies are often segmented along racial and gender lines, 
the intensification of exploitation of low-wage workers disproportionately affects female workers 
as well as workers belonging to racialized or other oppressed groups. 
In addition, by disproportionately targeting female-headed households, the adoption by 
welfare ‘reforms’ of the workfare requirement devalues women’s caring labor (Abramovitz 
2002: 222; Folbre and Nelson 2003: 121).  The welfare rights movement, which, gaining 
inspiration from the Civil Rights Movement, has defended low-income families’ access to 
welfare support, can be interpreted as, in part, a movement demanding official recognition of 
women’s caring labor as valuable work that deserves to be rewarded (Amott and Matthaei 1991: 
314; Federici 2012: 6-7, 43, and 98).  Thus, the workfare requirement reflects not just 
neoliberalism’s opposition to government support for the poor (as opposed to government 
support for corporations and wealthy, which neoliberals have often supported— Panayotakis 
2010: 12; Crouch 2013: 220; George 2001: 12; Harvey 2005: 188; Jackson 2017: 189; Wright 
and Rogers 2011: 392 ) but also its backlash against the social gains of new social movements in 
the post-Civil Rights era. 
Thus, the way some private-sector workers have sought to mitigate the effects of rising 
exploitation has increased the surplus produced by and extracted from public sector and 
(primarily female) household workers.  Interestingly, however, the very same attacks which have 
increased the surplus extracted from  the latter have often produced further effects in the private 
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sector, which counter the benefits from lower taxes that segments of the squeezed working class 
hoped to reap when they joined the neoliberal coalition. 
 
7. Conclusion 
As the analysis above indicates, understanding the processes that keep workers divided also 
requires taking into account the implications of the existence of structurally distinct sites of 
surplus production within contemporary capitalist societies.  This structural feature of capitalist 
societies builds on and interacts with the racial, gender, and other social divisions and hierarchies 
that progressive economists have discussed in their explanations of the dynamics which often 
prevent workers from joining forces against capital.   
In addition, this structural feature of capitalist societies also adds a twist to the 
appearance that private-sector workers are paid for their labor rather than for the reproduction of 
their labor-power.  This twist adds to the difficulty of building unity among workers.  Indeed, the 
mystifying appearance that private-sector workers are paid for their labor inclines them to 
believe that they support public-sector and household workers.  In reality, of course, the latter 
contribute as much to the reproduction of private-sector workers’ labor-power as private-sector 
workers do to the reproduction of the labor-power of workers within the other two sectors.  In 
this sense, theoretical recognition of the distinct sectors of surplus production within 
contemporary capitalism helps us understand why capitalist development has not, as Marx and 
Engels (1978) optimistically expected, unified workers.  It also represents, however, a necessary 
first step towards making Marx and Engels’ expectation a reality by helping workers, 
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irrespective of gender, race or the sector(s) of the economy they are active in, unite against 
neoliberalism’s relentless attempt to increase the surplus extracted from them.  
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